Make your own ID

November 24th, 2007 by Ben Goldacre in bad science, geek, ID | 82 Comments »

Ben Goldacre
The Guardian
Saturday November 24 2007

Sometimes just throwing a few long words around can make people think you know what you’re talking about. Words like “biometric”. When Alistair Darling was asked if the government will ditch ID cards in the light of this week’s data cock-up, he replied: “The key thing about identity cards is, of course, that information is protected by personal biometric information. The problem at present is that, because we do not have that protection, information is much more vulnerable than it should be.”

Yes, that’s the problem. We need biometric identification. Fingerprints. Iris scans. Gordon Brown says so too: “What we must ensure is that identity fraud is avoided, and the way to avoid identity fraud is to say that for passport information we will have the biometric support that is necessary.”

Tsutomu Matsumoto is a Japanese mathematician, a cryptographer who works on security, and he decided to see if he could fool the machines which identify you by your fingerprint. This home science project costs about £20. Take a finger and make a cast with the moulding plastic sold in hobby shops. Then pour some liquid gelatin (ordinary food gelatin) into that mould and let it harden. Stick this over your finger pad: it fools fingerprint detectors about 80% of the time. The joy is, once you’ve fooled the machine, your fake fingerprint is made of the same stuff as fruit pastilles, so you can simply eat the evidence.

But what if you can’t get the finger? Well, you can chop one off, of course – another risk with biometrics. But there is an easier way. Find a fingerprint on glass. Sorry, I should have pointed out that every time you touch something, if your security systems rely on biometric ID, then you’re essentially leaving your pin number on a post-it note.

You can make a fingerprint image on glass more visible by painting over it with some cyanoacrylate adhesive. That’s a posh word for superglue. Photograph that with a digital camera. Improve the contrast in a picture editing program, and print the image on to a transparency sheet, then use that to etch the fingerprint on to a copper-plated printed circuit board (it sounds difficult, but you can buy a beginner’s etching set at Maplin for £10.67). This gives an image with some three-dimensional relief. You can now make your gelatin fingerpad using this as a mould.

Should I have told you all that, or am I very naughty? Yes to both.

It’s well known that security systems which rely on secret methods are less secure than open systems, because the greater the number of people who know about the system, the more people there are to spot holes in it, and it is important that there are no holes. If someone tells you their system is perfect and secret, that’s like quacks who tell you their machine cures cancer but they can’t tell you how: it’s nonsense. Open the box, quack.

In fact you might sense that the whole field of biometrics and ID is rather like medical quackery: as usual, on the one hand we have snake oil salesmen promising the earth, and on the other a bunch of humanities graduates who don’t understand technology, science or even human behaviour. Buying it. Bigging it up. Thinking it’s a magic wand.

But it’s not. The leak last week wasn’t because of unauthorised access, it couldn’t have been stopped with biometrics; it happened because of authorised access which was managed with a contemptible, cavalier incompetence. The damaging repercussions for 25 million people will not be ameliorated by biometrics. What about the stalker, or the estranged husband, buying the address of his target?

And will biometrics prevent ID theft? Well, it might make it more difficult for you to prove your innocence. And once your fingerprints are stolen, they are harder to replace than your pin number. But here’s the final nail in the coffin. Your fingerprint data will be stored in your passport or ID card as a series of numbers, called the “minutiae template”. In the new biometric passport with its wireless chip, remember, all your data can be read and decrypted with a device near you, but not touching you.

What good would the data be, if someone lifted it? It would be everything. Jim Knight MP, the Labour Minister for Schools and Learners, said in July: “it is not possible to recreate a fingerprint using the numbers that are stored. The algorithm generates a unique number, producing no information of any use to identity thieves.” Greg Mulholland MP replied: “I hope that that is clear to all those listening, because it is an important reassurance on the points that the hon. Gentleman has made.”Crystal clear Jim, Greg. Unfortunately, a team of mathematicians published a paper in April this year, showing that they could reconstruct a fingerprint from this data alone. In fact, they printed out the images they made, and then – crucially, completing the circle – used them to fool fingerprint readers.

Ah biometrics. Such a soothingly technical word. Repeat it to yourself.


Here is the Matsumoto “Gummi” paper:

And here’s a great presentation featuring really nice photographs of the process:

Here’s the paper on producing a fingerprint from the minutiae template:

Here’s a nice pic:

If anyone’s interest in this kind of thing is piqued, I recommend Ross Anderson’s book (although I disagree with him on issues around medical data for research):

And Bruce Schneier’s security newsletter is excellent:

And here’s a video of some chaps doing the biometrics tricks:

And this from the comments, which I should have mentioned:

There is a true anti-ID cards campaign, and it’s been going for quite a while and it’s had its own victories in this very long and difficult fight. Just visit

I would encourage everyone who comments here to write to their MP (easily done, at and at the very least draw their attention to Ben’s column and, if you have more time, to the wider problems with ID cards. No2ID has a lobbying guide which is linked to from their front page. Even if you only have 10 mins to spare, it is worth sending a quick note to your MP to make your feelings known.

If you like what I do, and you want me to do more, you can: buy my books Bad Science and Bad Pharma, give them to your friends, put them on your reading list, employ me to do a talk, or tweet this article to your friends. Thanks! ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

82 Responses

  1. Mike said,

    November 25, 2007 at 7:23 pm

    Thanks Nigel Sedgwick for your comment #49 re my comment #37.

    I am not an expert mathematician, but do know that combining probabilities can have results which are counter-intuitive. I tried to alert my MP to this, telling him that it made me suspicious of the proposed National ID database.

    Thanks to everyone else taking this threat seriously.

  2. BobP said,

    November 25, 2007 at 10:47 pm

    @32 Robert Carnegie:

    I’m a bit rusty on data protection, but I think the position is as follows –

    The Eight Principles of Data Protection are listed here:

    (NB – HMRC is exempt from this)

    If it’s true that you have server level access to personal data on your system, then the system does not conform to principle #7 (secure) and maybe #2 and #5. If you go anywhere near them, then that shoots #1,2, and 6. do you think you ought to tell your DP manager about this?

    I also have completely unwarranted read access to my employer’s system, it’s great fun and I don’t really want to point it out to anybody but this little voice keeps telling me that I ought to.

    Which, I think, serves to reinforce Ben’s main point about the fallibility of big complex systems.

  3. crana said,

    November 25, 2007 at 11:43 pm

    The photograph and use to make a gummy finger is the centre of one of the earliest forensic science detective stories, The Red Thumb Mark by R. Austin Freeman. He wrote it largely to illustrate the dangers of relying so heavily on fingerprints when solving crimes, and it’s not a bad read at all – out of copyright, and free online

  4. Robert Carnegie said,

    November 26, 2007 at 1:14 am

    On the RFID shield question, I tried keeping my cell phone in a metal case a while ago and apparently it took it off the network. On the other hand, presumably tagged goods sold in shops can’t be carried out in a metal mesh bag – or perhaps they can. I suppose the latter case is only “detect that activated tag is in range”, rather than detailed meaningful communication, which is the requirement for chips that contain data.

    On data security, I’m involved in maintenance and programming, and it would be more difficult to do my job and to help users of the system to do their jobs without access to data, and I never use my access inappropriately (intentionally; sometimes I mistype a command and I see something I shouldn’t look at). But as far as I can see (for instance from that), the only thing preventing it is me.

  5. BobP said,

    November 26, 2007 at 9:51 am

    Robert – fair enough, your access is necessary & justified as part of your job and you are effectively in a position of trust.

    In my case, it’s spurious. Time for a chat with the DP manager.

  6. jackpt said,

    November 26, 2007 at 3:12 pm

    Norbury, the easiest way to acquire a specific fingerprint it to get them to touch something clean. You could do this by passing them something like a pencil case or ID card, dust their front door, dropping something in front of them that they’ll pick up and pass to you (drop a bundle of CD cases), dust their car door, dust their mobile phone, take all of the paper from their recycling paper-bank, dust their wheeliebin, dust their windows, use their bathroom and dust it, their desk pencil-holder, desk, etc. and a few more imaginative ways. It may take a couple of tries but it’s not that difficult.

    At present it’s fairly easy to steal an ID, but not very easy to keep up the pretense. Every time you used it you’d significantly increase the chances of being rumbled because of anti-fraud measures. But, with an ID card once it is accepted nobody asks any questions because the computer says yes. It’s a bit like knowing a PIN number for a chip and pin credit card – if you know that nobody asks any questions, while they used to have to compare signatures.

    So if the governments ID scheme can be broken it’s much worse than the present situation. And if it is adopted we have to hope that all British governments in the future don’t misuse it. That is something nobody can guarantee.

    I don’t think aluminium would work, most Faraday cages are made of fine copper latices because of the properties that has.

  7. quietstorm said,

    November 26, 2007 at 7:52 pm

    I was always worried that ID cards may become the “preferred method” of identification.

    I lose stuff. All the time. It’s very irritating, but I’m slightly absent-minded, and have a tendency to go out drinking every so often, and as a result stuff gets misplaced.

    If my credit cards get misplaced, then I have other id to back them up. If my driver’s license gets misplaced, I have a passport to persuade people I am who I say I am. If my passport and work permit gets misplaced (oh dear god, can’t even imagine the hassle there) I have a birth certificate/driver’s license/a long history of communications with the Canadian immigration people/national insurance number card/social insurance number/tax forms etc to fall back on to persuade people that I am the person I say I am and they can renew my passport and other important papers.

    Those people who advertise the ID cards as the only piece of ID anyone would ever need scare me witless. Especially when you think how easy it might be to fool the various detectors into thinking that you were the person identified on the ID. I want lots of official pieces of paper and cards etc which determine my identity. It makes it much harder to steal my identity if all the proof of it is kept in different places. It makes it very easy to steal my identity if it only involves a card (which I would probably end up having to carry with me all the time), my fingerprint and perhaps my eyeball…

  8. Finger waggler said,

    November 26, 2007 at 8:55 pm

    Uh oh, i seem to be in disagreement with many of the posts. But, i hope i’ve got an open mind…

    I think it’s clear that pretty much any security system will have holes.

    The highly determined will always try to get around the security of any database or ID systems, and the key question is ‘is it possible to keep ahead and prevent most (if not all) subversion.

    Yes, the ID card system has risks, but are we going to stop trying new systems? We can’t go back to the victorian era…

    Also too of the rhetoric seems to be about things that are possible, but i would describe as unlikely.

    I’m no great fan of government IT projects, but do like the idea of being able to keep quite efficient tabs or assorted crims and undesirables. However, this may be because i don’t watch many Hollywood conspiracy flicks…

  9. jackpt said,

    November 26, 2007 at 10:14 pm

    Finger Waggler, what crimes do you think it would prevent?

    How do you think that it would keep tabs on “assorted crims and undesirables”?

    And how do you think any of the objections raised compare to Hollywood conspiracy flicks?

  10. Finger waggler said,

    November 26, 2007 at 10:26 pm

    I think it might help the police find those who have absconded from jail or parole. There seem to be quite a few people that the ‘polis’ are keen to have a word with, and these individuals would find it hard to keep out of view. I know it seems rather 1984, but even Google ‘tracks’ people.

    While the ID scheme has flaws, i have lived in the US, where a drivers licence is a de facto ID card. Strangely, they manage pretty well. In europe, i believe that the germans and french are obliged to carry ID.

    My Hollywood allusion refers to the fear that somebody is going to steal your ID. It does happen, but rarely ! I claim it isn’t easy, and is unlikely to happen in a high proportion of the population. If it did, the system wouldn’t work and would be abandoned.

  11. Finger waggler said,

    November 26, 2007 at 10:47 pm

    And another thing… An ID system does make it less attractive to people that wish to abuse our hospitality. I think that the UK has a generous approach to those that have genuine asylum claims (and that is good) but there will always be some (hopefully few) that want to abuse the system. Not to mention those with even more sinister aims. ID cards are not foolproof, but they will make it less easy to hitch a free ride, and deter some (but not all). Is that such a bad thing ?

    And relating to the hollywood analogy, why is it the the government are ‘completely crap’ at the ID security, but ruthlessly efficient at having the black clad stormtroopers in slient helicopters ? Somewhat odd…

  12. jackpt said,

    November 26, 2007 at 10:53 pm

    I sort of agree with your point about ID theft being a bit Hollywood, but preventing ID theft is one of the reasons politicians are promoting the cards. If it doesn’t prevent ID theft, as Ben has demonstrated, it removes one of the key arguments.

    Point 1, people who have absconded from prison or parole will not make a point of interacting with the state. That is where the ID cards are will be used. Carrying them is not mandatory, even if it were abscondees would not carry them for fear of being checked.

    Point 2, in countries with ID schemes there are not lower levels of ID theft, and it has not prevented terrorism or fraud. The figures are all comparable with ID card free UK. I believe ID theft is higher in the United States.

    In 2006 there were 80,000 cases of identity theft in the UK, affecting roughly 0.13% of the UK. (old fashioned fraud/organised crime is still far more lucrative) Given identity theft is comparable or worse in countries with ID schemes, why do you think fraud with UK ID cards is any more unlikely?

    So I agree that ID theft is comparitively rare, but the benefits of a passable biometric ID would make them a far more lucrative target for criminals.

  13. jackpt said,

    November 26, 2007 at 10:58 pm

    And another thing… An ID system does make it less attractive to people that wish to abuse our hospitality. I think that the UK has a generous approach to those that have genuine asylum claims (and that is good) but there will always be some (hopefully few) that want to abuse the system. Not to mention those with even more sinister aims. ID cards are not foolproof, but they will make it less easy to hitch a free ride, and deter some (but not all). Is that such a bad thing ?

    Hasn’t prevented illegal immigration in France, Germany, Spain, or the United States. I don’t see why ID cards would here. The majority of illegal workers wouldn’t be issued ID cards because the state doesn’t track them. So it’s not a deterrent.

    And relating to the hollywood analogy, why is it the the government are ‘completely crap’ at the ID security, but ruthlessly efficient at having the black clad stormtroopers in slient helicopters ? Somewhat odd…

    That’s rather unfair. I think there’s very few people in this discussion that think of things that way.

  14. isitmedicine said,

    November 26, 2007 at 11:12 pm

    Even if every problem listed above could be solved, my main objection to ID cards would still be on the grounds that pretty much every single company or organisation that I have dealt with and who has held data on me has cocked something up at one point or another. Service providers, councils, inland revenue, banks – they make mistakes (tiny or monumental) often enough for me to actually expect it. I don’t see how this would be any different. Except that the consequences would be far more severe.

  15. Mike said,

    November 26, 2007 at 11:52 pm


    Prion – 03:32pm Nov 26, 2007 GMT (#1980 of 2007)
    If the probability that facial recognition would correctly match a person to their entry on the NIR is 0.69 (69%) and fingerprint recognition is 0.81 (81%) and iris recognition is 0.96 (96%), then the probability of ALL three matching you on the database would be 0.9956 (99.56%) (Using Bayes theorem)


    stochata – 07:59pm Nov 26, 2007 GMT (#2004 of 2007)
    Bayes theorem says P(A|B)=P(A)P(B|A)/P(B)

    The formalism (X|Y) is “X given Y”. For example, the probability it’s you given a positive biometric match.

    For example, P(A) is the probability it is you (1 in 60 million if we have 60 million records in our database), P(B) is the probability that the scan matches you arbitrarily (unknown: it’s essentially, what proportion of the population match any one scan). We do know P(B|A), the probability of the scan matching given it’s you: e.g., for facial recognition, 0.69 or whatever it was. P(A|B), the probability of it being you in front of the scanner given a postive match is also unknown.

    Unfortunately, this doesn’t help us because there are too many unknowns.

    If someone knows either of the unknowns or their complements (the probability it’s not you given the scan is negative, or the probability of a negative match), then Bayes theorem might be useful.

    As it stands it’s just a bizarre diversion. The use of it above is incorrect.

    Edit: I should add that A needs to be independent of B. Given it’s not, Bayes theorem in any case should be used with caution.

  16. Filias Cupio said,

    November 27, 2007 at 1:24 am

    Off-topic a bit:

    The Onion on the ‘fake acupuncture cures backpain’ study:

  17. Norbury said,

    November 27, 2007 at 7:08 am

    Jackpt, exactly. That’s pretty hard to do. It means for example that you have to target someone specific. As for signatures being secure, you are having a laugh aren’t you? When were they ever checked? I signed as Donald Duck many times. Here’s my story, once I dropped my wallet, on my way back to work after lunch. I didn’t notice till the next day. In the two hours after dropping several hundred pounds were spent, using my signature protected card. Be more difficult to do with a fingerprint protected card.

  18. philbo said,

    November 27, 2007 at 2:01 pm

    As someone who’s worked with biometrics for over a decade, I agree completely with his tirade above, and add a couple more observations:
    There is a problem with the people selling the biometric technologies not recognizing the limitations, and believing that any deviation from the perfection of identifying everybody every time is simply a matter of getting the technology right. In practice, biometric technology has got much, much quicker and more powerful over the last few years, but hasn’t actually got any better at all.
    Re the “snake oil” comment – a joke /truism I was told by an American chap soon after I started:
    Q: What’s the difference between a used car salesman and a biometrics salesman?
    A: The used car salesman knows when he’s lying

  19. jackpt said,

    November 27, 2007 at 2:59 pm

    Norbury, I don’t know if you follow the news, but ID cards are being sold as preventing identity theft. ID theft, and the success thereof, depends on targeting someone specific. Otherwise it’s no more profitable than taking a credit card from the street. They could belong to a bum. Once you have a biometric, such as a fingerprint, it’s far more profitable. So, there is a clear economic reason for getting someones fingerprint, they can change their PIN, they can have their signature checked, but they cannot change it. I realise what Ben has outlined may seem very hard and complicated for some, but it really isn’t that difficult at all. A couple of hours work for tremendous gain if you’re a criminal. I think you greatly underestimate the abilities of criminals and greatly understimate the abilities of people checking signatures, in order to support your argument.

    Finger waggler, an illegal immigrant is defined by the Home Office as those that have entered the UK without authority (e.g. bypassing border controls), those who have entered with false documents, and those that have overstayed their visa. Identity cards wouldn’t be issued to people that entered the UK without authority. They may be issued to people who entered on false papers, but then the situation wouldn’t be any different from today because they’re going to avoid being in situations where their identity cards are used. They may even throw them away. Likewise people that have deliberatly overstayed their visa. Given the majority of those people work in the black economy it is unlikely that ID card will affect them at all.

    It’s nothing like saying ‘cars should be banned because sometimes they kill people’. That is what is called a straw man argument. The argument is that the benefits from ID cards will be marginal or non existent, and it will not solve or affect the issues it is puported to solve. This is an opinion backed by the majority of the UK’s experts in the field of information security and cryptogtaphy.

  20. diceman said,

    November 27, 2007 at 3:07 pm

    To take a differing tack on this.

    What if somebody was able to access the database and insert false records or modify existing ones?

    With a modification of existing records, if the data is encrypted onto the actual card you carry, then there would be no immediate repercussions but when you came to renew your card (assuming like passports renew every 10 years) then the system would reject you. This could cause huge problem for somebody.

    Likewise with false records, once the data was in the system it would not be challanged.

    Anybody going to tell me that this would not make the ID database a huge target for hackers?

  21. Tony Edwards said,

    November 27, 2007 at 6:40 pm

    Thinking of keeping things on paper and still making mistakes brings to mind something that happened many years ago in my early days with an aircraft/missile manufacturing company. An aquaintance ordered two items using the inordinately long NATO numbers. Next thing he knew was several rather severe security men wanting to know why he had ordered two Bloodhound missiles!
    All it took was a few numbers wrong, from memory, I think it was two numbers transposed, and, whoopsie.
    Keeping your data to yourself is best.

  22. vinnyr said,

    November 28, 2007 at 9:43 am

    To all those who don’t like Ben’s throwaway remark about humanities graduates, yes it is a generalization, and I don’t believe for a minute that he thinks that ALL humanities graduates are science illiterate.

    The problem is that there is a vast imbalance of humanities to science graduates in the media which is why there is a huge problem of the media misunderstanding and therefore misreporting scientific issues.

  23. mikew said,

    November 28, 2007 at 10:38 am

    Also, it’s unthinkable that the radio and TV journos don’t understand economics/politics, whereas they still feel it’s OK to make comments suggesting that “we normal people wouldn’t understand that sciency stuff”.

    Instead of dumbing down – “smarten up”, and don’t patronise us! The TV audience should at least be capable of GCSE maths/physics/chemistry.

  24. ShatterFace said,

    November 28, 2007 at 1:25 pm

    I’m a humanities graduate and I deserve all the stick I get.

  25. scotlyn said,

    November 28, 2007 at 1:28 pm

    Per DrJon – “And get rid of the bloody “you must BEE logged in” please!” – how about redating the archives for August and January of 1007?

  26. censored said,

    November 29, 2007 at 1:26 pm

    The ID card thing reminds me of the Derren Brown trick, where he convinced the lady to pay out on the dogs, even though she knew full well that his ticket was not for the winner.

    If an ID card/passport checks ok on the system, the guard/policeman/stasi will wave you through. You’d only need to look vaguely like the picture. The computer says yes, so it’s a yes.

    Given that passports can already be scanned and copied, without the holder knowing, anyone could walk through border control provided they’re the same race/gender as the photo they’ve nicked as the computer says yes.

    Clone a fingerprint, and you could look even less like them.

  27. Emiloosh said,

    December 3, 2007 at 4:36 am

    A bit of a tangent (ok, a big one), but I can’t help wondering if these cards will be a massive annoyance for those whose fingerprints become ground down through industrial processes. Individuals may have prints only seasonally, as their work or hobby allows. (I’m thinking of the highly specific example of metal polishing for jewellery… people in the industry might spend hours a day shoving bits of metal against a spinning wheel, covered in abrasive compounds.)

    I heard an anecdote about a jeweller who was held up at the US/Canada border because the guards couldn’t get a read on her prints. She supposedly had a hard time convincing them she wasn’t imperiling the homeland.

    Obviously not a problem with iris scans, but the fingerprinting story came to mind.

  28. tsuchan said,

    January 8, 2009 at 7:55 pm

    Kimpatsu said:
    “Her in Japan, all visitors and all foreign residents now have to be fingerprinted and photographed upon (re)entry to the country every time. This is a complete farce–and a violation of human rights to boot.”

    I’m no fan of ID cards or biometrics, and I’d vote against any party that proposed it. But you’re not right, Kimpatsu. It’s not a complete farce.

    The ability to defeat the fingerprint reader limits effectiveness and could result in innocent people being fairly easily set-up.

    But do you think that every foreign visitor who commits criminal acts in Japan:
    a) comes into the country with the express intention of doing that; and therefore also
    b) attempts to defeat that system; and
    c) has the dexterity not to get caught by an immigration official who is about 50cm away and dealing with only the one person at a time?

    (And remember that in the Japanese system there is also a camera to take a photo on the same machine.)

    Let’s think about in practice what conditios would have to be met to defeat the system. If we have somebody with a criminal record, who:
    a) Had a passport which didn’t already have their encoded fingerprint (or even a forged one that did have their own fingerprint, or conceivably even a real passport that had been originally made with a bogus fingerprint); and
    b) Had either a real passport that didn’t connect to their criminal record or a forged passport which didn’t trigger any alarm; and
    c) succeeded in hoodwinking both the immigration official and the fingerprint machine; and
    d) had a passport with a photo which passed both the immigration inspector’s and the machine comparison; and

    s/he may get through immigration, with the further possibility of having a problem at the Customs inspection.

    Of course if anything at all triggered suspicion, they’re going to be very lucky to get through a more rigorous check with their clumsily forged fingerprint.

    But if we talk about somebody who commits a criminal offence whilst in Japan, I think we can be fairly confident that the vast majority of them will not have even tried to defeat the fingerprint reader (if more than a handful of people were ever caught trying to do so, a new system of manual finger inspections would certainly be introduced) any fingerprints found at a crime scene would already connect to their name and passport.

    Summary: it may be defeated sometimes and it may make it easier for a criminal to set-up an innocent person, but in this case it’s not a farce. No, no, definitely not.

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